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Title: Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended
ISBN: 0679463232
Author:
Jack Matlock
Publicate Date: 2004-07-20
Publish: 2004-07-20
List Price: $27.95
Average Customer Rating: 4.0
Format: Hardcover
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Amazon Lowest New Price: $3.00
Amazon Lowest Used Price: $1.97
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1: Standing among giants
Reagan and Gorbachev are two of the most important men in the last half of the 20th century. Each of them, thru ways subtle and overt, led their nations to the point where the Cold War could end, and a new future could begin. Much has been written about what each did on their domestic fronts to move their governments and populations to this point, and much has also been written about how they worked together, sometimes in public and sometimes in private. This book focuses on the latter.
Written by a former ambassador to the USSR, this book gives detailed accounts of the discussions between the two leaders, discussions within the camp of each leader (though mainly in the US camp for obvious reasons), and highlights both the failures and successes in the on-and-off dialogue between Reagan and Gorbachev, and their underlings, throughout the 1980s. The author shows how Reagan consistently pushed human rights within the USSR as a the price for arms control, while the USSR wanted the end of Star Wars on its part. The reasoning and logic used by both parties is explained in detail, along with arguments and rivalries within Reagan's team. Overall, a good book that shows the intricacies of great power diplomacy, military - political rivalries, and conflict management and resolution.
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2: I agree--its about the 'turn'
This book's strength is that the author was present for this historic timeframe and his ability to recount details and nuances of character of the Amercians and Russians involved in the negotiation process. The photos usd could be better. there should have been more of mrs gorbachev and mrs reagan.
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3: Comparatively fair - as in balanced.
My thoughts on this book match up pretty much with Oberdorfer's book on the end of the Cold War, which was originally titled "The Turn." They both offer a more open-minded approach. Matlock, in this book, has a bit more distance from the event, which allowed him more access to the Soviet side. And he was an insider's insider to what occurred. Oberdorfer's account is as the top-notch journalist he was. It's easier reading and thoroughly entertaining.
Matlock offers a fairly moderate view on the end of the Cold War. For the past decade or so, the right has been on a mission to rewrite history about Reagan and the Soviet Union's demise. In essence, they want us to believe that the Soviet Union collapsed because Reagan drove them to it by building up the US military, which in turn forced the Soviets to build up; the Soviet problem though, was that they had limited resources. When pushed too far, they collapsed. Clever and convenient story. Also false.
Liberals don't really get it right either. They feel Reagan is irrelevant and that Gorbachev came in and saved the world. Also convenient and clever. And again, false.
The truth lies somewhere in-between. US policy towards the Soviet Union was well in place before Reagan came around. That isn't to say that there weren't differences between Reagan, Carter, Nixon, etc., but the idea of containment was already in existence. And we have Truman and Marshall to thank for that. Still, Reagan was absolutely correct to call the Soviet Union an "evil empire." They were. Reagan also offered the American people a positive vision and purpose. Finally, he showed that we could build up in a way that no nation could compete with us. Of course, we went further than was healthy; but alas, we are still standing - and they are not.
Gorbachev, too, was a different kind of leader. Because he still preferred socialism that does not mean he was Stalin or Brezhnev reborn. Gorbachev was different. Plain and simple. He could have fought harder and killed to maintain Soviet supremacy over the East. Some of his predecessors have done just that - by the millions no less.
Both Reagan and Gorbachev, as well as social forces much bigger than any individuals, played important parts in a process that was much greater than its parts. Matlock justly notes all of those facts and he takes us through a fairly brief account of the actual meetings and inside discussions that helped change the world into something better. But the future, as we all found out on 9/11, was not without risks and problems.
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4: The real Reagan - even better than a myth
Jack Matlock's review can leave many Reaganites dissatisfied. He claims that Reagan DID NOT win the Cold War, at least single-handedly. He reveals, contrary to the moanings of the Communist fanatics, that the US DID NOT have an agenda to destroy the Soviet Union, whose collapse it actually feared for unforeseen circumstances. There WAS NOT even a plan to destroy the Communism, as it seemed unrealistic. What was at the beginning was a much more modest (by the count of today, not twenty-three years ago, though) agenda of not letting the USSR think that it can win the arms race and compel the world to subservance; to get the Soviets out of violation of numerous arms treaties and stop supporting terrorism; to get them out of the Afghanistan; to make it more respectful to human rights inside and around its empire. Not quite modest, though! Matlock shows quite convincingly that the US missile programs and especially SDI (Star Wars) were not enough to wear down the Soviet Union to the point of destruction: anyway, if the USSR did not chose to reform from inside, it could easily survive (although I would personally argue that the Reagan administration DID work to undermine the USSR economically - remember the pressure to push down oil prices, for example). And of course, Reagan did not force Gorbachev and perestroika. The latter happened largely due to a sequence of historic accidents: Russian leaders kept dying and the only one suitable to take (not one foot in the grave) office actually happened to be the one with aspirations to reform. Then Reagan found a partner at the table who can be sensible to his words and pressure. Former KGB head Andropov promoted Gorbachev for years, what an irony!!!
But here is what Reagan really DID. He DID convince the Soviets they could not prevail over the US in either arms race or grabbing new additions to its empire. He DID NOT chicken in the negotiations and made Soviets pretty much acquiescing to the US demands. This was extremely important as Gorbachev could not really start reforms without easing up the burden of arms race. In the end of the day, he understood that in order to disarm, he NEEDED the reforms - he had to be relieved from the pressure of hardline dogmatics in the Politbureau in order to eliminate very symbolic but essentially pointless stumbling blocks in the negotiations. So, Reagan really and honestly worked towards the end of the cold war, I would even say, there may be the case that he actually forced its end once Gorbachev was there, but the historical accidence and the good will of Gorbachev was an equally important factor. The same policy might not have resulted in what it resulted in with another aging blockhead in Kremlin, but Reagan's policies would surely make even this hypothetic blockhead abandon some of Brezhnev's ways.
Then, however, liberal leftists would be absolutely stunned to find out who Reagan WAS. Contrary to their cliches, Reagan WAS de-facto a Wilsonian romantic who dreamt about the world without nukes (and irritated the Socialist icon Francois Mitterand enormously on this), who pressed human rights as hard as he could; who was not a war mongerer, who paid due respect to Russia, its history and the people. He DID not score cheap propaganda points, however. Sometimes, talking endlessly about human rights could harm more the people suffering behind KGB bars than help them. He was very much aware, and did not do what Jimmy Carter still claims credit for as 'true humanitarian.But he quietly helped many dissidents. ' He WAS smart enough to understand that Gorbachev is cornered by hardliners, and never claimed he 'defeated' him in negotiations even when Soviets de-facto acquiesced to the American demands and principles. He WAS standing up against some real hawks and hardliners in his administration. Again, he was a Wilsonian in goals, but very realist and shrewed in means.
Back to Matlock. He dispels one more myth, that is, that the US actually WON the cold war. Over whom? Communism, there was a triumph of democracy, which is definitely not a zero-sum outcome. If over Russia, Russians could emerge as the greatest winners in cold war if they treated their newly-found freedom with a more accuracy.
And when reading this book, one comes to understand why Matlock endorsed Kerry, not Bush, in the last elections. Reagan never was a unilateralist. He cherished allies even when the latter disdained him. He understood and respected enemies, and above all, he was a man of ideals.
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5: Wonderful tale, but...
While I find this an intriguing account, I must disagree with the author's theory that the cold war ended earlier than the collapse of the Soviet regime. Soviet reforms relied on the person of Gorbachev, and it was not until the final collapse after the coup attempt that we could be sure of the long term path of Russia. While Matlock makes the valid point that the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union were two separate events, the two were intimately related, and it's in my belief we could not formally declare the end of one without the sure and certain demise of the other.
That being said, Matlock has written a fascinating and absorbing "pre-quel" to his "Autopsy on an Empire". Here is Reagan with all his flaws, yet with the steadfast purpose that secured his place in both national and international history. Gorbachev too is illustrated as the determined yet all too human reformer, who although ultimately failing in his task, nevertheless takes the courageous steps that create an environment which allows for the bold rebirth of a nation.
I must admit to being a bit miffed at Ambassador Matlock for his recent endorsement of Senator Kerry for the upcoming US election, but I give him credit for his telling of a tale of incredible and perhaps unprecedented scope. I give four stars for the tactical analysis, but withhold the final one for what his former boss once called "the vision thing". Nevertheless this is an invaluable book for any student of the late cold war period.
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