1: Asset Specificity, Equality, and Democracy
Boix seeks to explain the emergence of various political systems; particularly the transitions between democratic governments, right-wing authoritarian regimes, and left-wing dictatorships. However, Boix's use of triangulated research - the combination of quantitative and qualitative measures - provides a more accurate explanation of regime transition than Lipset's original work.
Boix uses three main independent variables to explain political outcomes. First, Boix examines rates of inequality. He suggests that a nation with a more equitable distribution of assets is likely to see the emergence of a democratic regime. Boix writes, "A more unequal distribution of wealth increases the redistributive demands of the population and the ultimate level of taxes in a democratic system. As the potential level of transfers become larger, the authoritarian inclination of the wealthy increase and the probabilities of democratization and democratic survival decline" (37).
Second, Boix examines the specificity of assets, that is, whether or not assets are expropiatable to other countries. The author contends that the more liquid an asset, the more likely a democratic regime will emerge. Boix asserts that if the wealthy are able to expropriate their assets to other nations, these assets are less likely to be taxed heavily by the poor. As such, the upper classes will be more receptive to a democratic regime. On the other hand, assets that are nontransferable - such as oil wealth - are likely to be subject to heavy taxation by the poor if a democratic regime took hold. As such, it is in the best interest of the wealthy elite to repress the poor and protect their monopoly of assets.
Lastly, Boix looks at the impact of political resources on regime transition. The costs and benefits of repression or revolt fluctuate between social classes under various circumstances. Boix argues that, holding inequality and specificity constant, the conflict between these oppositional groups, and their relative political strengths and weaknesses, lead to the emergence of specific regime types. He writes, "rich and poor assess both the income and benefits associated with each political regime and the costs of achieving their preferred solution" (44). For example, an authoritarian regime often operates in the interests of the ruling elite. So long as the costs of repressing the poor are less than the costs of granting universal suffrage, authoritarianism will continue. On the other hand, if a shift in the balance of power between classes occurs, transition becomes more likely. Boix argues that as the poor gain political resources, and overcome the problems of collective action, they are likely to put pressure on the upper classes (45). The cost of repression to the wealthy then becomes too high to justify continued authoritarianism and democracy emerges. If the poor believe that they have gained political power, or that the cost of being repressed has become unbearable, revolt ensues, and a left-wing dictatorship takes over.
Boix's combination of econometric techniques and qualitative analysis has reexamined the modernization and democratization debate and will prove a lasting contribution to the field.
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