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Title: High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Krushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
ISBN: 0345466713
Author:
Max Frankel
Publicate Date: 2005-09-27
Publish: 2005-09-27
List Price: $15.00
Average Customer Rating: 4.0
Format: Paperback
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Amazon Lowest New Price: $8.90
Amazon Lowest Used Price: $8.45
Amazon Merchant Price: $11.70
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| Customer Review: |
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1: The Decisionmakers' Story
Max Frankel's "High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" is a short, readable account of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. As the name implies, Frankel focuses on the actions, decisions, and thoughts of the two major players in the crisis - President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.
Frankel was a correspondent for the New York Times and reported on the crisis at the time. He had also been posted to Moscow and had many acquaintances in the Soviet government at the time. Frankel used White House recordings of the Executive Committee meetings, the correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and Sergei Khrushchev's (Nikita's son) memoirs, along with contemporary press accounts, as the basis of his book.
Because the book focuses on the leadership, Frankel doesn't really tell the military story, nor does he delve into the effect of the crisis on the American or Soviet people.
This is a good, short (less than 200 pages), and readable history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Anyone hoping to get a broad overview of this episode or understand some of the diplomatic maneuvers would enjoy this book. However, this book is far from the definitive story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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2: it could easily have ended badly
In these days of a proclaimed War on Terror, Frankel reminds us that the past was worse. In this recent recounting of the Cuban missile crisis, many of the facts are already known. But Frankel's narrative points out the myriad ways that disaster could have occurred. With mistakes in perception by both the American and Soviet leaderships.
If anything, John Kennedy's reputation is enhanced. He chose a grimly rational peace, instead of the prospects of a quick military victory in Cuba. Which may well have come about, given the American superiority in conventional forces around Cuba, but which may then have triggered a Soviet nuclear response. Curiously, too, in some ways, Khruschev also comes out of this tale well. Yes, he tried to put one over the Yankees. But ultimately, he also chose peace, even if he foresaw that it might lead to his downfall.
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