 |
|
Title: Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Island
ISBN: 0226706877
Author:
Joseph V. Rees
Publicate Date: 1994-05-28
Publish: 1994-05-28
List Price: $30.00
Average Customer Rating: 4.5
Format: Hardcover
 |
|
|
|
|
Amazon Lowest New Price: $25.93
Amazon Lowest Used Price: $3.02
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Customer Review: |
|
1: Technical Manual for Voluntary Regulatory Agencies
I work with organizations that are attempting to reduce the incidence of consequential events within their industries. These organizations have created a voluntary industry organization to provide oversight. Over time, these voluntary organizations have had minimal success. It appeared a mystery since the industry organizations appeared to support the effort.
Hostages of Each Other addresses a successful use of such an organization: specifically the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). The book details the relationships that had to be developed between INPO and the nuclear industry in order for this arrangement to work. It also provides an overview of the programs and processes that have been put in place to make the industry they serve more successful.
For those trying to set up nongovernmental regulatory agencies, one of the most insightful sections of the book discusses the relationship of the industry CEOs to INPO; which is substantially different than the norm.
Probably the most difficult discussion revolves around what had to happen within the nuclear industry to bring this sort of relationship about. For those trying to make similar changes within other high hazard industries it begs the question: do we have to wait for something terrible to wake up the industry?
All in all, an excellent book for those involved in this type of endeavor. It clearly shows what is possible and what it takes.
-Richard
|
2: Insight into INPO
This book shows that in that in high hazard industries there is can be a big advantage in a strong industry body (in this case by revealing the workings of the the secretive Institute for Nuclear Power Operations [INPO]) over a weak regulator (in this case the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC]) if the industry has the will to achieve outstanding safety.
|
3: Disappointing analysis
For a long time I have been looking for a book with a coherent and convincing analysis on successful self-regulation. Well, perhaps any type of successful regulation. Books on regulatory failure are much easier to come by. And this book had such a promising setting. The claim: A single catastrophic accident at any one US nuclear plant would have ruinous consequences for the entire industry. Each licencee is a hostage of every other licencee. Safety pays! Result: the nuclear industry has founded the INPO organization, to police uniform high safety standards, simply to protect industry's huge investment in nuclear power.
Rees' basic hypothesis is that nuclear power plants operate on some sort of Enlightened Self Interest (ESI). This assumption on rationality is never explicitly stated however, nor is it examined critically. But Rees argues from industry sources that nuclear plants strive to be safe, they compete with each other to be the safest, and that the nuclear industry provide INPO with muscle to make life difficult for those who either cannot or will not do so.
Surprisingly, many of Rees' examples have kind of a dualism. On the one hand, Rees' examples tell a story on how the Three Mile Island accident resulted in soul searching and catharsis, how the transformaton has resulted in increased industry responsibility, how new controls have been set up, and how INPO succesfully fulfills its policing role. But many of the examples could equally well be interpreted the other way around:
- that INPO has been given only weak powers - the so-called Management by Embarassment in closed industry fora. Not stong ones; because linking INPO evaluations and insurance cost, for instance, can affect stock price enormously (p94)
- that INPO is extremely cautious not to alienate its sponsor base (p145)
- that the "safety pays" notion is not widely shared across industry, to say the least, and that cost-cutting on safety is widespread
- that the wake-up call from Three-Mile Island is not received by all actors
For instance, take the example of the INPO crack-down in 1987 - eight years after TMI (!) - on a plant where all operators had fallen asleep on several occasions, leaving operating reactors unattended. Is this an example of a more fundamental free-rider problem in the industry and an opportunity to re-examine the rational ESI assumption ?- or is it an example of succesful INPO peer-pressure intervention? Rees only considers the latter.
It is a mystery to me why Rees has not exploited this alternative line of interpretation and the reason why I find the analysis disappointing.
Rees demonstrates that self-regulation can improve the safety of some plants, likely in ways that public regulation cannot achieve and possibly in a more efficient manner. But the analysis fails to demonstrate that self-regulation can replace public regulation, which is surprising, bearing in mind the "hostages of each other" setting of the analysis.
|
4: Persuasive Argument For Communitarian Regulation
Joseph Rees has written a superior account of the improvements in nuclear systems safety since the Three Mile Island accident. Without getting too deep into the technical details of nuclear systems or chemistry (other than a basic explanation of the general theory of plant operation and a bit of detail about the faulty PORV design), Rees analyzes TMI from a human factors and safety systems vantage point, and subsequently details the improvements made to the US nuclear power industry since the accident.
Rees especially details the workings of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a non-governmental industry group which oversees safety more diligently than even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a system that Rees dubs "communitarian regulation." He details industry problems such as "nonconservative decision making" and provides useful analogies to other industries. The case of Consolidated Edison (p. 154) is of particular interest for those people interested in studying corporate safety systems and programs.
I highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in nuclear power, and particularly to professionals and students with an interest in industrial safety, regardless of their specific field. This book has applications in every industry, and will improve the understanding of human factors and industrial safety for any interested reader.
|
5: Hostages of Each Other
This book is about how the Nuclear Energy Industry "bootstrapped" itself to improve operational and nuclear safety after the TMI accident. Prior to TMI, the NRC had been enforcing minimum safety requirements, not promoting operational excellence. The industry realized it might not economically survive another TMI, and while the fundamental design of the plants appeared to be safe, significant operational improvements were needed to reduce the chance another similar accident. The industry formed INPO (the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations) to share information and resources to promote excellence and safety in operations. The book is full of stories of what happened and quotes from the principles involved (no heavy technical stuff) and I found it an enjoyable, interesting read. The author is a professor at the Center for Public Policy at Virginia Tech, and I detected no pro or anti-nuke sentiment, just lots of well researched information. Probably the best book I have read on the subject.
|
|
|
|
|
