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Title: Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong
ISBN: 0060780703
Author:
Marc Hauser
Publicate Date: 2006-09-01
Publish: 2006-09-01
List Price: $27.95
Average Customer Rating: 3.0
Format: Hardcover
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1: A Mess. Hauser Is Both Confusing and Deeply Confused
This is a horribly written (at times incoherent) and poorly argued for book. Hauser's main thesis is that humans have a "moral grammar" analogous to the universal grammar made famous by Chomsky's theory of human language acquisition. Unfortunately Hauser offers little evidence to support his "theory" of universal moral grammar. His theory is actually a loosely held together notion that is more armchair speculation than actual systematic scientific theory.
My first complaint is stylistic. I am usually not a stickler for style in scientific writing but the book is so bad in this area that something must be said to warn the potential reader. The reader is subjected to prose that meanders between the redundant to the trivial to the nonsensical. For example, odd phraseology such as describing at one point how one can "literally" pull "propositions" out of a hat slow the reading down and makes the reader wonder about the English proficiency of the writer. Hauser also repeatedly makes seemingly absurd claims without any justification such as claiming that Swedes would wage warfare on anyone who would dare to try to tell them to change religions (p. 416). I am not being nitpicky here; the book is filed with these kinds of stupid, nonsensical, and absolutely bizarre statements.
Content wise, the book also fails. Hauser tries to establish his "theory" by listing a hodgepodge of empirical studies from ethology, neuroscience, psychology, anthropology and economics which he claims support it. Unfortunately the reader is not given any reason whatsoever to believe this. It's an uncontroversial truth that humans do have innate moral instincts given us by our evolutionary history but philosophers have known about the natural inclinations toward morality for, literally, thousands of years (Aristotle, Confucius, Mencius, for example all described how humans are naturally endowed with moral instincts, capacities, dispositions and emotions). This thesis is not new and it does have justification in the empirical sciences. But to claim that there are universal grammars analogous to universal linguistic grammars is to make a far stronger and more audacious claim, a claim that Hauser does not prove in this work (it seems to me he doesn't even offer much of an attempt). Many of the experiments he uses to "support" his thesis are only tenuously linked to it at best. At times Hauser strains to establish a connection and at other times no connection is apparent at all. His strategy seems to be to impress readers by throwing as much information as possible at them in the hope of impressing them with red herrings. At times, even Hauser seems to get confused by his own examples and how they are linked to his thesis. The critical reader gets the impression that Hauser's repeated uses of ad hoc interpretations of the experimental data are desperate attempts to save what little substance there is in the book.
In arguing his case, he also makes use of ideas developed from moral philosophers. But his understanding of moral philosophy is grossly inadequate. His "Humean Creature" would have been completely alien to David Hume; his "Rawlsian Creature" likewise to John Rawls. It seems to me that he could have completely omitted all the talk of these moral creatures and stuck with the sciences, subject matters he has had far more experience with albeit uses incompetently to establish a very nebulous claim.
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2: Disgusted with Hauser
Hauser ends his book "Moral Minds" as follows.
"The notion of a universal moral grammar with parametric variation provides one way to think about pluralism. It requires us to understand how, in development, particular parameters are fixed by experience. It also requires us to appreciate that once fixed, we may be as perplexed by another community's moral system as we are by their language. Appreciating the fact that we share a universal moral grammar, and that at birth we could have acquired any of the world's moral systems, should provide us with a sense of comfort, a sense that perhaps we can understand each other." (p 406)
I have rarely started a book with such delight only to end it with such disgust.
Hauser is not only wrong but lazy when he says we may be "as perplexed by another community's moral system as we are by their language." It is *impossible* to be as perplexed by another community's morality as we are by its language. (Though female genital mutilation and honor killings horrify me, they do not perplex me: I "get it" but I also reject it.)
As for acquiring "any of the world's moral systems," Hauser never identifies and distinguishes them. I would like to know if he's thinking there are six major moral systems, or fifty, or several hundred if not thousands. The only moral systems he has a serious interest in are those of Kant, Hume, and Rawls, but Hauser never makes clear in what sense those three men were speaking different moral languages. Further, he attributes the three systems to these specific individuals and not the communities wherein these men grew up and presumably had the parameters of their native moral tongues permanently fixed. (One would think that Hauser would realize that by attributing the three most important ethical theories going--in his view, anyway--to individuals rather than communities, he has undercut his assumption that we take in our morality the way we take in our native languages. No one "grows up" Kantian; one chooses it.)
Hauser does speak of the ethics of hunter-gatherer communities, and of herding communities. He blames excessive violence in the American South on the region's Irish and Scotch settlers--herders--whose honor-based morality contrasts sharply with that of peaceful German and Dutch farmers who settled the North. But if a Southern (Irish) woman marries a Northern (Dutch) man, what is the moral language of their children?
Hauser sees UMG explaining why people from many backgrounds give the same answer to moral dilemmas. I think this is a conceptual mistake. Granted, I'm no linguist and may misperceive the analogy, but it seems to me that Chomsky's universal grammar focuses on the *structure* of spoken languages whereas Hauser focuses on the *content* of moral judgments.
Further, Hauser focuses only on moral emergencies. This would be like a linguistic theory that explained only expletives. (Grammatically, expletives are *exceptional* cases.) We have a multitude of chances to cheat on our taxes or spread rumors about colleagues but few chances to make an instantaneous life or death decision. Consider how Hauser treats a *slow* life and death decision, the Terri Schiavo case.
Hauser favored the removal of feeding tubes. Further, he argues that those opposed to this were basing their judgments on religious teachings and that morality and religion should be "divorced." But he argues elsewhere that moral judgments are *immune* to religious instruction; yet if that were so, such a divorce would make absolutely no difference at all. (Most who favor the divorce of religion and morality think that religion has a negative moral impact and *that* is why they want the divorce; it makes no sense to ask for a divorce if religion is *irrelevant* to one's moral judgments.)
Hauser is having it both ways: arguing that moral judgments are immune to religious instruction but then saying that the Terri Schiavo controversy arose because some people were making moral judgments based on religious instruction while other people (-in the same culture, no less) were not. Also, he clearly thinks those who wanted to remove the tubes were right and those who did not were wrong, but he provides no basis for judging the relative merits of claims made in different moral languages.
I understand that Hauser is using language as an analogy and that no analogy is perfect, but I finished this book wondering in what ways he thought the analogy held. There are thousands of languages but apparently just a few moral systems. Some of these moral systems may be attributed to a specific individual, which no one's native language can be. If morality is like language, why aren't there as many moral systems as languages? What is the moral equivalent of being bi-lingual? One can translate Greek philosophy into Latin, or German, or English, but how can one translate "herder morality" into "farmer morality"? Or Christian morality into atheist terms? Or Rawlsian morality into Kantian terms?
Hauser has gathered much fascinating research but his assessment is more than shaky.
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3: How Moral?
I thought it was telling the book had a positive review on the back by Chomsky and in the intro the author name-drops Chomsky as one of his friends. Does this mean the author is lacking morals, if so does this mean he isn't human (since all humans have an innate sense of right and wrong according to him?) To me this also says something about the great Chomsky. He also name-drops animal rights hero Singer, a text book example of the deadly dangers of self-righteousness and undue vilification of innocent people. Above all I found the book too dull and lacking in real content to read it properly,and acually threw it away in disgust(only ever done that with one other book) so this review is definately flawed, but I doubt you'll even like it if you're a fan of pedestrian cliches Singer and Chomsky.
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4: Terrible writing
This book is about a very interesting subject but it's been nothing but misery to read. I think Hauser must have actually decided that the key to writing readable, engaging non-fiction is to NEVER walk in a straight line. So we have him wandering here, and there, and everywhere. The burden is on the reader to figure out what he's really up to. What specific moral instincts is he postulating? What's the evidence that there are instincts? How is his theory about moral instincts like Haidt's or Pinker's? I've been trying to get through this for ages and I might...just...have...to...stop.
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5: Natural Morality
Over the last decade the study of the human brain has moved out of the leafy halls of academia into many different fields, including ethics and the law. If socially unacceptable behavior is being driven by some wiring problem in the brain, is a person legally liable? Or is the brain just one part of the chain of causes with learning and experience playing a larger part? The lion's share of the evidence indicates that genes and the brain determine how we interact with the environment rather than determining how we behave, but there is still a great deal of research that needs to be done.
This book has been getting a lot of attention and for a very good reason: not only is it a well-written account by someone who is an exceptionally clear thinker, but the implications of his book stretch far beyond simple academic discussions: they have implications not only for neuroscience, but for ethics, spirituality and the law.
Marc Hauser is a biologist at Harvard and in this book he argues that the human moral sense is inbuilt and the product of evolution, much like our capacity for language. He suggests that the structure of our minds - or at least our brains - reflect our egalitarian hunter-gatherer past and reveals "left over circuitry from the cavemen."
Hauser begins by contrasting three approaches to moral thinking:
The first was espoused by the philosopher Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century, who proposed that we follow a categorical imperative. In Kant's view, we could and should live by the Golden Rule, treating others as we would have them treat us, and never using people merely as a means to something else.
The second approach was proposed by the eighteen century Scottish philosopher David Hume, who came to the conclusion that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. So if we do something because we are frustrated or angry, we should be castigated and punished because we failed to express out true nature.
The third approach is that of the political philosopher John Rawls. Rawls - like the Harvard linguist Noam Chomsky - proposed that there are deep similarities between language and morality. Chomsky believes that we are hardwired to understand and produce language, while Rawls believes that we all have an innate moral faculty. What that means is that we are all born with an ability to form moral judgments, and that we do not simply embrace the views of our family, tribe or church. The rub is this: because it is an innate ability bred of countless millennia of evolution, we often have no idea why we hold the views they we do.
The parallels between our innate morality and language are explored in this book.
When a twenty-nine year old Chomsky produced his first book in 1957 it created a firestorm of protest as well as some enthusiastic acceptance. We know that people the world over utter grammatical sentences in their own language, but it had been assumed that it began as simple mimicry: children copied the language, syntax and grammar of their parents and others. But Chomsky proposed that the ability is hardwired into the structure of the brain, and that is why we have little or no insight into how grammar works. By analogy, Hauser proposes that children and adults construct moral codes and make judgments without any insight into their reasons for doing so.
Hauser is an acclaimed academic, and it is no surprise that he supports his hypothesis with an array of thought-provoking examples, some better known than others.
One of the better known has been used in psychology and philosophy classes for years. It is the Trolley Problem, taken from a classic set of moral dilemmas proposed by the philosopher Phillipa Foot. The story goes like this. A bystander named Denise is a passenger on an out-of-control railway trolley, which is speeding down the track with an incapacitated driver. The vehicle is heading directly toward five people on the track ahead, bringing with it certain death. Denise can flip a switch that would turn the trolley onto a sidetrack with just one person on it. That one person will die, saving the other five. Should she flip the switch? Hauser's own intuition is that she should, and he marshals various moral arguments to support him.
But now comes the second part. Consider another bystander named Frank. He is on a footbridge over the same railway trolley with the same five endangered people. On the bridge is a large man whom Frank can push off the bridge and so stop the trolley and save the five. Should he do so? Should he sacrifice one man to save five?
Here Hauser's view is that he should not. But exactly why not? Is it because of Denise and Frank's intentions? Is it because Frank would be using the man as a means? In each case the result is the same, one person is killed and five are saved. This is interesting, not as an academic exercise, but because most people come up with similar responses to the dilemma.
Here is another example: what if a surgeon can save the lives of five dying people by taking organs from one perfectly healthy person? Almost no one says that this action is justified, but why not? In fact when such a thing was actually done during the Holocaust, the prosecutors at Nuremberg considered it to be one of the most egregious of all the crimes committed. The utter breakdown of agreed moral norms during those dark years and continuing depravity in some parts of the world remains a challenge for philosophers and scientists to this day; including the author of this book.
Hauser is evidently a good teacher, and he constructs a number of variations of these themes to show us that, with the kinds of exceptions that I just mentioned, the intuitions of very different people are usually much the same. Second. He shows how difficult it is to provide logical justifications for those intuitions. Like all good teachers he includes some personal disclosures, and tells an amusing tale about his own father, who, despite being an intelligent and well-educated physicist, became confused and frustrated when he tried to find logical justifications for his immediate responses.
Hauser reviews evidence from different cultures and from his own research using an online Moral Sense Test, to show how little judgments vary between people of different backgrounds and cultures.
This leads to another important similarity between language and morality. Languages are not chaotic: they follow certain constraints. All known languages follow a set of universal principles. But there are also a set of variable parameters that include the order of words, different ways of making plurals, gender attributions and all those other nuances that can frustrate anyone trying to master a foreign language. Hauser argues that it is the same with morality: there are universal principles and culture-bound parameters. He continues the parallels to point out that as with a language, once people acquire their specific moral grammar, other grammars may seem as incomprehensible as does Japanese to a native English speaker.
He illustrates his thesis with valuable discussions about murder and manslaughter, the treatment of women in different cultures, attitudes to abortion, euthanasia, pedophilia and incest, together with notions of fairness and punishment.
The book is illustrated by some delightful little drawings that do an excellent job of breaking up the narrative.
Marc Hauser if a very good writer and the book is not a difficult read, despite weighing in at over 400 closely reasoned pages. He makes many points that need to be heard. Not only by his colleagues and by people curious to understand more about themselves and those around them, but also by politicians, lawyers and ethicists.
Highly recommended.
Richard G. Petty, MD, author of Healing, Meaning and Purpose: The Magical Power of the Emerging Laws of Life
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